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Regulation of Sports Agents and College Football:
Perception or Reality?
Noam Silverman
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the current system in which football players transition
from amateur athletes to professionals in the National Football
League (“NFL”), the only available means for a player to showcase
his talent is through participation in collegiate athletics.1 Additionally, even if an extremely talented high school player wanted to try his
luck in the NFL without college experience, he would be forced to
wait three years after graduation before being eligible to play in the
2
NFL. While the NFL does not require any player to participate in
collegiate athletics in order to play in the NFL, the three year waiting
period, coupled with the fact that initial entry in the league is through
the “College Draft,” indicates that the only real means for a player to
have access to playing in the NFL is by first showcasing his skills in
college.3
With collegiate football being the only means for a player aspiring to play in the NFL to showcase his skills, a player’s eligibility to
participate in college football is of the utmost importance. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) governs college
football, as well as all collegiate athletics.4 The NCAA regulates athletic competitions amongst 1070 schools that span three divisions of
5
college athletics. One of the primary purposes of the NCAA is “to

1
Under the NFL collective bargaining agreement, signed in 2011, there is no form of
sanctioned minor league professional football where players showcase themselves for the major
professional clubs. See NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (Aug. 4, 2011) [hereinafter NFL CBA], available at http://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargainingagreement-2011-2020.pdf.
2
See id. at 17 (requiring an individual to wait three years after the year they graduate or
should have graduated high school in order to be eligible to play in the NFL).
3
See id. at 17.
4
2010-2011 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 1 [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL] (2010), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D111.pdf.
5
Division I consists of schools who offer fourteen sports and includes 335 schools. Division II has 288 schools that must offer at least ten sports. Division III schools make up the re-
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encourage its members to adopt eligibility rules to comply with satis6
factory standards of scholarship, sportsmanship and amateurism.” As
such, it is a requirement that all student-athletes participating in the
7
NCAA must maintain amateur status. The primary requirement for
an athlete maintaining his or her amateur status under the requirements of the NCAA is refraining from accepting any type of monetary
compensation for competing in collegiate athletics.8
While the majority of the NCAA sports and NCAA athletes have
no issue with adhering to the amateurism requirement, the 2010
NCAA football season has been marred with numerous accounts of
players receiving money for playing college football.9 The vast majority of these stories have come from sports agents enticing college athletes to use their representation for negotiations with professional
teams in exchange for money or other benefits while the players are in
10
college. Agents paying college athletes is not just a violation of
NCAA rules, but also a violation of federal law,11 a majority of state
laws,12 and a violation of the National Football League Players Association (“NFLPA”) Regulations Governing Contract Advisors

mainder and are eligible for the NCAA with only one sport. Differences Among the Three
NCAA.ORG,
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/who+
we+are/differences+among+the+divisions/division+I (last visited Mar. 7, 2010).
6
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at 1.
7
Id. at 65.
8
See id. at 61-76.
9
Former football sports agent Josh Luchs revealed to Sports Illustrated in October of
2010 that he personally paid more than thirty college football players and that this type of activity was the norm amongst agents looking to achieve success in representing college athletes as
they become professionals.
George Dohrmann, Confessions of an Agent, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED
(Oct.
18,
2010),
available
at
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/
MAG1175725/index.htm (former agent Josh Luchs was the primary source for the article).
10 See Agent Scandal Costs UNC Three Players, ESPN.COM (Oct. 11, 2010),
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5673405; Ivan Maisel & Mark Schlabach, Dareus
May
Have
Attended
Agent’s
Party,
ESPN.COM
(July
22,
2010),
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5396236; NCAA Seeks Insight on Rogue Agents,
ESPN.COM (Oct. 27, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5735310; Alan Scher
Zagier, Agent Oversight Continues to Vex College Sports (Sept. 2, 2010),
http://www.gazettextra.com/news/2010/sep/02/agent-oversight-continues-vex-college-sports/.
11 Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (SPARTA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801-07 (2006).
12 Uniform Athlete Agents Act (UAAA) drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Approved and Recommended for Enactment in all the
States. FAQ on Uniform Athlete Agents Act, NCAA.ORG (July 29, 2010), http://www.
ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2010+news+stories/July+lates
t+news/FAQ+on+Uniform+Athlete+Agents+Act. As of July 2010, the UAAA has been adopted by forty states and the District of Columbia. Id. Additionally, California, Michigan, and
Ohio have adopted non-UAAA legislation for regulating agents. Id.
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(“RGCA”).13 Given the fact that agents can be regulated through
federal and state law, as well as through the NFLPA, one would think
that players receiving payments from agents would not be any issue
for the NCAA. However, given what has been reported in 2010
alone, it is clear that agents are still paying players in order to obtain
the players’ commitment to allow the agent to represent the player.
This Comment will discuss the various regulations that are currently in place to curb the issue of athlete agents paying college football players and offer some suggestions for how to improve the current system in order for the NCAA to maintain its goal of promoting
amateur athletics. Section II will focus on the background of the
NCAA, including the importance of maintaining true amateur collegiate athletics. Additionally, this section will cover the background of
the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (“SPARTA”),14 the
15
16
Uniform Athlete Agents Act (“UAAA”), and the NFLPA RGCA.
This section will also cover the public policy, which ultimately led to
the enactment of federal and state laws governing athlete agents.
Section III will provide analysis for why, even with all the regulation in place, there are still major issues with maintaining true amateur athletics for the NCAA. This section will deal with the limited
power the NCAA has in preventing unethical agents from tampering
with collegiate athletes. Additionally, the reasons why the NCAA
must maintain a positive public image if it hopes to remain a true amateur league will be explained. The pros and cons of the state and
federal legislation will also be discussed. Lastly, this section will explain why the NFLPA has the greatest power to regulate agents but
also the least incentive to enforce its power.
Finally, Section IV will provide several potential means by which
those with the power to curb the issue could act to prevent players
and agents from tampering with the true amateur nature of the
NCAA. This will include the media’s role in shaping public perception of the NCAA, as well as the perception of the issues, the potential impact a minor league football league could have, and how the
NFLPA choosing to hire its own in-house agents could solve the issues with agents paying collegiate athletes.
13 Any certified NFLPA agent is prohibited from offering anything of value to a potential
client or his family to encourage that person to use the agent’s services. NFLPA REGULATIONS
GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS 8 (2007) [hereinafter NFLPA RGCA], available at
http://images.nflplayers.com/mediaResources/files/PDFs/SCAA/NFLPA_Regulations_Contract
_Advisors.pdf.
14 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801-07 (2006).
15 Uniform Athlete Agents Act (2000) [hereinafter UAAA], available at http://www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uaaa/aaa1130.htm.
16 NFLPA RGCA supra note 13.
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II. BACKGROUND
The NCAA, federal government, state government, and NFLPA
all have an interest in ensuring collegiate athletes are not receiving
improper benefits from agents. One of the NCAA’s primary goals is
to promote intercollegiate amateur athletics.17 The federal government and most state legislatures have enacted laws in order to deter
18
agents from soliciting collegiate athletes with improper benefits.
Lastly, because a violation of federal or state law would call into question the integrity of a sanctioned agent, the NFLPA also has an interest in ensuring collegiate athletes are not receiving benefits from
agents.19 The following sub-sections explain the background of the
NCAA, federal and state legislation, and the NFLPA in order to show
what each entity has done to ensure that collegiate athletes maintain
amateur status.
A. NCAA
Originally named the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the
United States (“IAAUS”), what has become today’s NCAA was
20
founded in 1906 as a means to regulate college football, which had
become an extremely dangerous sport.21 While the NCAA has expanded to cover all collegiate athletics, its purpose of protecting play22
ers and improving intercollegiate athletics remains the same. Aside
from regulating the athletic competition itself, the NCAA also serves
as the regulatory body for school institutional control over athletic
programs, ethical conduct, athletic personnel, amateurism, recruiting,
eligibility requirements, and financial aid.23
With the growing popularity of college football, the enforcement
of NCAA rules has become more difficult than when its only purpose

17

NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at 1.
See Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (SPARTA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801-07
(2006); Latest News, supra note 12.
19 See NFLPA RGCA, supra note 13, at 8-11.
20 The name was changed to the NCAA in 1910.
History, NCAA.ORG, http://
www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/who+we+are/about+the+ncaa+his
tory (last updated Nov. 8, 2010).
21 The lack of standardized rules and regulations in college football led to numerous injuries and even deaths which prompted several schools to eliminate their football programs and
created the need for a regulatory body. Id.
22 See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at 1.
23 See generally NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4. The current Division I manual contains
431 pages of rules and regulations intended to maintain the integrity of the NCAA as an organization whose primary goal is the maintenance of an amateur collegiate sports program. Id.
18
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was maintaining player safety.24 The popularity of NCAA sports has
led to large television deals and has made the NCAA an extremely
25
large organization. Given the high revenue reported, there are many
who feel college athletes should be paid, including many athletes
themselves.26 With players feeling entitled to payment, it leaves the
door open for unethical agents to take advantage of the situation and
offer to pay the players while they are in college in exchange for the
agents having the opportunity to later profit from the players by rep27
resenting them in contract negotiations.
As part of its effort to maintain the integrity of college sports, the
NCAA rules state that any athlete that uses or receives any benefit
from an agent is no longer eligible to compete in NCAA sanctioned
events.28 Additionally, any school that knowingly allows an illegible
student to compete, or is an unknowing multiple offender, has com29
mitted a major violation under NCAA rules. The presumptive penalties imposed on an institution guilty of a major violation are extremely severe and include a two-year probationary period, a reduction in recruiting visits for one year, a requirement that coaches are
not allowed to engage in off-campus recruiting for one year, a reduction in financial aid awards, post-season sanctions, and a requirement
that the institution recertify that it is in compliance with all NCAA
rules.30
While the NCAA, as shown through the harsh penalties, takes
the integrity of its competition extremely seriously, NCAA rules only
address the issue of collegiate athletes who accept improper benefits

24 A 2009 Harris poll showed college football as the third most popular sport, and most
popular college sport, trailing only professional football and baseball respectively. Football
Expands Lead Over Baseball as America’s Favorite Sport, HARRISINTERACTIVE.com (Feb. 1,
2010), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/Harris-Interactive-Poll-Research-Sports-Popularity2010-02.pdf.
25 The NCAA generated roughly $722 million in total revenue from the 2009-2010 athletic
seasons. See Where Does the Money Go?, NCAA.ORG, http://ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/
public/ncaa/answers/nine+points+to+consider_one (last visited Mar. 7, 2011). The NCAA distributes sixty percent of its revenue back to its member institutions. Id.
26 See Kelly Whiteside, College Athletes Want Cut of Action, USATODAY.COM (Aug. 31,
2009), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/2004-08-31-top-ten-number-7_x.htm.
27 See Dohrmann, supra note 9. The compensation for an agent can be quite lucrative as it
can reach three percent of the total value of the players’ salaries. NFLPA RGCA, supra note
13, at 12. Put in perspective, the agent who advised Donovan McNabb’s contract extension
worth $70 million would receive $210,000 on this one contract alone. See Adam Schefter, ’11
Bonus Key in Donovan McNabb Deal, ESPN.COM (Nov. 18, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/
nfl/news/story?id=5812371.
28 NCAA Manual, supra note 4, at 73.
29 Id. at 319-20.
30 Id. at 322-23.
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31
and not the agent who has provided the benefits. The NCAA has no
regulatory power over the agents since the NCAA can only penalize
32
its members, and agents are not members of the NCAA. Additionally, there is nothing in the NCAA rules that prohibits an athlete from
speaking with or receiving advice from agents.33
The NCAA requirements are that the amateur athletes refrain
from entering into contracts with agents or receiving any benefits
from agents.34 A collegiate athlete becomes ineligible under NCAA
rules by entering into any contract, either oral or written, with an
35
agent. An athlete also loses his eligibility for agreeing to allow an
agent to represent him once his college career has ended.36 Lastly, a
collegiate athlete cannot receive benefits of any kind from an agent,
regardless of whether the agent has any intent of representing the athlete.37 The term “benefits” has been interpreted broadly by the
NCAA. It has included things as minor as taking a ride to class on a
38
39
golf cart, as well as the more obvious financial gifts.
The players have little to fear from the NCAA because by the
time they get caught, if they are caught at all, they will have likely already left college and moved on to the NFL or another career.40
NCAA investigations of rules violations are often not completed until
years after the violation occurred. Arizona State University was not
penalized until five years after their infractions began,41 the NCAA
took two years before they announced a penalty for rule violations at

31
32
33
34
35
36
37

See id. at 73-74.
See id. at 7-8.
Id. at 73.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

38 University of Southern California freshman running back Dillon Baxter was ruled ineligible for NCAA competition after he accepted a ride on a golf cart on USC’s campus from an
NFLPA agent. Pedro Moura, USC Wants Dillon Baxter Reinstated, ESPNLOSANGELES.COM,
http://sports.espn.go.com/los-angeles/ncf/news/story?id=5827657 (last updated Nov. 22, 2010).
The ride was considered an extra benefit. Id.
39 University of North Carolina football players Marvin Austin, Robert Quinn, and Greg
Little lost their NCAA eligibility for accepting jewelry and airfare from an agent. Agent Scandal Costs UNC Three Players, ESPN.COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5673405
(last updated Oct. 11, 2010).
40 The Dillon Baxter and UNC scandals may represent a trend that the NCAA will have
quicker investigations, and players may be more likely to suffer some penalty for accepting
improper benefits.
41 Division I Committee on Infraction Issues Decision on Arizona State University ,
NCAA.ORG (Dec. 15, 2010), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/PressArchive/2010/20101215+asu+coi+
rls.htm.
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the University of Michigan,42 and six years after initially violating
NCAA rules, the University of Southern California was finally disci43
This means that by the time the
plined for its rules violations.
NCAA comes out with a ruling, the player is most likely well beyond
his college career. This leaves the colleges to face the brunt of the
punishment as the NCAA charges each member institution with the
responsibility of ensuring that it is in compliance with NCAA rules.44
B.

SPARTA

The Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (SPARTA) is the
federal government’s response to the issue of unethical agents paying
45
college athletes. SPARTA begins by broadly defining who classifies
as an “athlete agent” and “student-athlete,” as well as providing
broad definitions for the types of contracts covered including agency,
endorsement, and professional sports contracts.46 SPARTA makes it
illegal for any athlete agent to solicit or recruit a student-athlete into
entering an agency contract by using misleading or false representations, or by providing the student-athlete with anything of value.47
Additionally, the act requires that any time an agent enters into an
agency contract with a student, the agent provides the student with a
48
disclosure document. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) enforces SPARTA, and any violation of SPARTA is considered an unfair or deceptive practice under section 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.49
In addition to the FTC having the authority to enforce SPARTA,
the attorney general of any state that has reason to believe that the act
is being violated can bring a civil action on behalf of the residents of
the state to enjoin the agent, enforce compliance with SPARTA, or

42

Division I Committee on Infractions Issues Decision on University of Michigan,

NCAA.ORG (Nov.
univ+of+mich.htm.

4,

2010),

http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/PressArchive/2010/20101104+d1+coi+

43 Division I Committee on Infractions Issues Decision on University of Southern California, NCAA.ORG (June 10, 2010), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/PressArchive/2010/20100610+d1+

coi+usc.htm.
44 See NCAA Manual, supra note 4, at 3.
45 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801-07 (2006).
46 Id. at § 7801. SPARTA essentially considers an agent any person who recruits or solicits
a student-athlete to enter into a professional sports or endorsement contract other than the
athlete’s family.
47 Id. at § 7802(a)(1)(A)-(B).
48 Id. at § 7802(b). The disclosure statement must state that the athlete knows that he or
she is forfeiting future eligibility by signing the contract and that either the student or the agent
must notify the school that the student has signed and is no longer eligible. Id. § 7802(b)(3).
49 Id. at § 7803.
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50
obtain restitution for any damages caused to the state. The states
also have the authority to conduct their own investigations for violations of SPARTA and compel witnesses to appear or produce documentary evidence.51 The FTC, however, maintains the right to intervene in any action brought by an attorney general.52
SPARTA also gives any college affected by a violation of the act
53
a civil right of action. If a college receives any form of discipline
from the NCAA, or gives itself any self-imposed sanctions to comply
with NCAA rules, the college has the right to recover any expenses
incurred or ascertainable damages as a result of the discipline received due to the action of the agent.54 A lack of determinative case
law or clarification in the statute leaves a grey area for what exactly
these damages might be. For example, one potential punishment a
college may receive is a loss of scholarships.55 However, the damages
suffered from this punishment would only affect athletic performance
in making a determination of any financial damages difficult. Even
the financial loss a school may suffer from a penalty of not being able
56
to participate in postseason events are speculative because no team
is guaranteed to qualify for postseason play. Absent any additional
legislation or guidance from courts, it is still unclear as to what potential damages a school can recover.57
Lastly, Congress, in its SPARTA legislation, encouraged the
states to adopt their own sport agent regulations.58 Congress felt that
each state should have its own scheme for regulating agents in order
to protect the student-athletes and to protect the integrity of amateur
athletics.59 Particularly, Congress felt that the states should require
agents to register with the state and provide protections to the stu60
dent-athletes in the process of signing with an agent. As part of their

50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Id. at § 7804(a)(1).
Id. at § 7804(c).
Id. at § 7804(b)(1).
Id. at § 7805(b)(1).
Id. at § 7805(b)(2).
See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at 322-23.
See id.

57 SPARTA also gives private citizens a right of action for damages caused by an agent. 15
U.S.C. § 7806. Presumably, the only private individual who could bring a claim would be an
athlete that lost eligibility as a result of the agent’s deceptive practice. In this instance too, there
would be a question as to what damages the athlete could recover since they cannot receive
compensation in college. It would be difficult to determine the actual damages suffered from
losing eligibility.
58 Id. at § 7807.
59
60

Id.
Id. These protections include the right for the student-athlete to cancel the agency

contract and require the agent to make disclosures to the student-athlete.
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recommendations to the states, Congress also felt that the states
should enact the Uniform Athlete Agents Act.61
C.

UAAA

The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws drafted the Uniform Athlete Agents Act (“UAAA”).62 At the
time the UAAA was released, twenty-eight states had some form of
legislation regulating athlete agents with all of them having a great
deal of variance from each other.63 The differences in the registration
requirements and the lack of reciprocity amongst the states made it
extremely difficult for agents to operate in multiple states and remain
compliant with the varying laws.64 As a result, the NCAA, along with
several universities, requested the Conference to draft a uniform set
65
of laws for the states. With the help of representatives from the
NFLPA, as well as representatives from the players associations of the
66
National Hockey League and Major League Baseball, the Conference drafted the UAAA, which has since been adopted by forty
states.67
The first major component of the UAAA is its strict registration
requirement. Under the UAAA, before any individual may initiate
contact with a student-athlete for the purpose of entering into an
68
agency contract, that person must register with the state. Even if the
individual is approached by the student-athlete, rather than selling his
services, that individual would have seven days to apply for athleteagent registration in order to continue the relationship.69 Any contract entered into with an agent who is not properly certified is automatically voided under the UAAA.70
The registration requirement is the greatest distinction between
the UAAA and the federal laws of SPARTA. As part of the registration process, the agent requesting certification must make a number

61

Id.

62

UAAA, supra note 15.
See id. at 1.

63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1-2.
FAQ on Uniform Athlete Agents Act, supra note 12.
UAAA, supra note 15, at 7.
Id.
Id. The comment indicates that the purpose of this section of the UAAA is to make an

extremely broad registration requirement in order to satisfy the minimum contacts requirements
of Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). By requiring registration in any state
where the agent contacts a student-athlete, the agent would have established minimum contacts
in those states.
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71
of disclosures. These disclosures include the name and location of
the agent’s businesses, the agent’s formal training and practical experience, a list of character references, any partners in the agent’s venture, whether the agent or any of his associates have ever been convicted of a crime, and whether the agent or any of his associates have
72
ever been sanctioned for any professional misconduct. After making
these disclosures, the attorney general of the state then has the power
to determine whether the agent has the “fitness to act as an athlete
agent.”73 When determining the fitness of the agent, the secretary of
state may consider any relevant information disclosed in the application form as well as how recent any harmful conduct occurred and the
nature and context of any potentially harmful conduct.74 Once an
agent is approved, he must renew the application every two years and
even when re-approved, the secretary of state maintains the right to
suspend or revoke the registration.75
The UAAA contains the same warning to the student-athlete as
SPARTA, but the UAAA also adds several requirements for the
agency contract not required in SPARTA.76 The UAAA requires the
contract to contain the method for compensation of the agent as well
as any other individual that may be compensated as a result of the
student-athlete signing the agency contract.77 The contract also must
specify any costs the student-athlete would need to reimburse the
agent for, the description of the services of the agent, and the duration
and date of execution.78 The failure of the contract to include any of
these requirements would make the contract voidable.79 These provisions are designed to protect the student-athlete in the process of sign80
As an additional protection offered by the
ing with an agent.
UAAA, any student-athlete has the right to cancel any agency within

71
72
73
74
75

See UAAA, supra note 15, at 8-10.
See id.
Id. at 11.
See id. at 11-12.
Id. at 13-14. Additionally, each state may include registration fees for initial applica-

tions, applications based on registration in another state, renewals, and renewals based on registration in another state. Id. at 15.
76 Compare id. at 17, with 15 U.S.C. § 7802(b)(3) (2006).
77 UAAA, supra note 15, at 16.
78 Id. at 16-17.
79

Id.
See id. at 17. For simplicity in drafting, the reference to student-athletes applies to both
current and former student-athletes. See id.
80
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fourteen days of signing the contract.81 A student-athlete cannot
waive this right.82
Following the registration and contractual formalities, the
83
UAAA deals with the prohibited conduct for athlete agents. The
84
prohibited conduct is similar to that of SPARTA. The prohibited
conduct forbids an agent from giving any false or misleading information to the student-athlete for the purpose of obtaining an agency
contract, giving the athlete anything of value prior to entering into an
agency contract, intentionally contacting a student-athlete without
registering with the state, and falsifying any disclosures in the registration form.85 Any violation of the prohibitions of the act leaves the
agent subject to criminal sanctions by the state in which the violation
86
occurred as well as a fine of up to $25,000.
Additionally, any violation of the act leaves the agent subject to
87
civil suits. The UAAA gives colleges and universities a right of action against both the agent and the student-athlete for any damages
caused as a result of a violation of the act.88 While the schools have
the right to sue both the agent and the student-athlete, the liability of
89
either under the act is several and not joint. The educational institutions have the right to recover damages incurred as a result of any
penalty or suspension from competition by the NCAA or any other
conference affiliation or damages from any self-imposed penalty in
order to mitigate any potential sanctions.90

81
82

Id. at 19.
Id. The comment indicates that this section of the UAAA addresses the disparity in

sophistication between the student-athlete and the agent, and that the athlete may still cancel
the contract even if the agent has completely complied with all of the requirements under the
UAAA.
83 See id. at 20.
84 Compare id. at 20-21, with 15 U.S.C. § 7802 (2006).
85 UAAA, supra note 15, at 20-21.
86 Id. at 21-23. The UAAA leaves the determination of the severity of the criminal sanction up to the state.
87 See id. at 22.
88 Id. This is a major distinction from the federal law under SPARTA as the UAAA
allows the school to sue the student-athlete as well as the agent.
89 Id. at 22-23. The comment to section 16 realizes that it will be unlikely for a university
to sue its former student athlete due to the negative impact it may have on future recruiting. Id.
However, the option is still available for especially egregious cases. Id. Additionally, section 16
does not limit the student-athlete from bringing his own suit against the agent for any damages
the agent may be liable for under existing law. Id.
90 Id. at 22. The school’s right of action does not accrue until the school discovers or with
reasonable diligence would have discovered the violation of the UAAA.
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D. National Football League Players Association Regulations for
Contract Advisors
While SPARTA and the UAAA have some deterrent and registration requirements that agents must follow in order to avoid criminal or civil penalties, the real power of regulating athlete agents who
represent NFL athletes lies in the NFLPA. Under the current NFL
collective bargaining agreement, the NFLPA is recognized as the
“[s]ole and exclusive bargaining representative of present and future
91
employee players in the NFL . . . .” As the exclusive bargaining representative of the players, the National Labor Relations Act gives the
NFLPA the exclusive right to represent NFL players in negotiations
over wages, working hours, or any other employment matters.92 As
the exclusive representative of the players, the NFL CBA recognizes
that under federal labor law the NFLPA has the sole authority to regulate the agents that represent any players in contract negotiations
with NFL teams.93
Under the current NFLPA Regulations Governing Contract Advisors (“RGCA”), no individual may, on behalf of a player, negotiate
with or advise an NFL team in regards to the terms of a player’s contract, unless that person is certified by the NFLPA, has a signed representation agreement with the player, and has filed that agreement
with the NFLPA.94 This includes anyone who gives counsel to a player with respect to negotiating contracts with the individual clubs, enforcing those contracts once signed, and anyone who provides counsel
on tax or investment services related to the negotiation of the contract.95 These rules are not set for any length of time, as the NFLPA
Board of Player Representatives and officers of the NFLPA have the
96
discretion to change these rules at any time.

91

See NFL CBA, supra note 1, at xiv.
See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
93 NFL CBA, supra note 1, at 210. The NFL may only use agents certified by the NFLPA
for contract negotiations with NFL teams. Id.
94 NFLPA RGCA, supra note 13, at 3.
95 Id. This section relates only to financial issues that deal directly with the contract as
there is a separate certification needed to become a financial advisor for an NFL Player. See
generally, NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION REGULATIONS AND CODE OF CONDUCT GOVERNING
REGISTERED PLAYER FINANCIAL ADVISORS (2007), available at http://images.nflplayers.com/
92

mediaResources/images/oldImages/fck/NFLPAregs(3).pdf.
96 See NFLPA RGCA, supra note 13, at 18. The Board of Player Representatives consists
of a representative from each NFL team and the officers consist of a president and ten vice
presidents elected from the Board as well as an executive director elected by the Board. See
NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION CONSTITUTION 9-12 (2007), available at http://images.nflplayers.
com/mediaResources/images/oldImages/fck/NFLPA%20Constitution%20-%20March%202007.pdf.
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In order to become an NFLPA certified contract advisor, an individual must pay a required application fee,97 attend the NFLPA
seminar for new agents, pass a written test, and file the required ap98
plication form. The only other requirement for an agent is an undergraduate degree from an accredited four-year school and a postgraduate degree from an accredited school. However, this requirement can be waived and there are no requirements for what field the
degrees must be in.99 Applications to the NFLPA will be denied if an
applicant made any false statements in the application, had any history of misappropriating funds rendering the applicant unfit to serve as
a fiduciary, had been denied by another professional sports association, and if the applicant had solicited a player for representation prior to being certified.100
Aside from the general requirements of attending training and
acting in a trustworthy manner, the only requirement relevant to
agent contact with student-athletes is the requirement that all agents
comply with applicable state and federal laws.101 Although the prohibited conduct does not specifically mention student-athletes, there are
prohibitions which effectively cover agents who have contact with
102
students that would violate NCAA rules. The rules specifically prohibit any agent from offering anything of value to any prospective
client or his family in order to encourage the person to become a client regardless of whether the prospective client is a student-athlete or
103
an NFL veteran. Additionally, agents are not permitted to have any
contact with any player who is not eligible for the NFL draft.104
Clearly an agent who was found to have violated SPARTA or
UAAA would be in violation of the NFLPA RGCA, and the NFLPA

97 The fee for 2012 was $2,500. Agent Regulations, NFLPA, http://www.nflplayers.com/
about-us/Rules--Regulations/Agent-Regulations/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2012).
98 NFLPA RGCA, supra note 13, at 3-4.
99 Id. This requirement seems to be easily waived in light of the NFLPA certifying Teague
Egan as a contract advisor while Egan was still an undergraduate at the University of Southern
California.
See Pedro Moura, USC: Student/Agent Warned, ESPNLOSANGELES.COM,
http://sports.espn.go.com/los-angeles/ncf/news/story?id=5836913(last updated Nov. 22, 2010).
100 NFLPA RGCA, supra note 13, at 4.
101 Id. at 6-8. With the enactment of SPARTA, and with a majority of states enacting the
UAAA, section 3 becomes applicable to agents who tamper with a student-athletes eligibility.
102 See id. at 8, 11.
103 Id. at 8.
104 Id. at 11. This section also does not mention student-athletes or any NCAA regulations.
See id. However, under the NFL CBA, a player is not eligible for the NFL draft until three NFL
regular seasons have been completed after the player has finished high school so this section
would apply to students up until their junior year at a university. See NFL CBA, supra note 1, at
17.
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could then suspend or permanently revoke the agent’s certification.
However, absent a criminal conviction or civil suit, the only manner in
which the NFLPA adjudicates violations of the RGCA is through arbitration of disputes brought by either players or other agents.106 Additionally, the president of the NFLPA appoints a committee of three
to five active or retired NFL players to serve on the Committee on
Agent Regulation and Discipline (“CARD”).107 CARD, with the assistance of the general counsel of the NFLPA, serves to prosecute
108
agents who violate the RGCA. CARD may file complaints against
an agent for violations of the RGCA to which the agent has the right
to answer. However, CARD retains the ultimate power to determine
whether the agent’s answer sufficiently rebuts the allegations and
whether or not discipline will be imposed on the agent.109 But CARD
is not the final authority on the agent’s discipline as the agent may
appeal to outside arbitrator. It should be noted that the arbitrator is
selected by the NFLPA.110
III.

ANALYSIS

With NCAA rules in place to maintain amateur collegiate athletics, SPARTA and the UAAA to protect the NCAA’s mission, and
the NFLPA RGCA which, without actually mentioning that it pertains to college athletes, prohibits the type of activity that the NCAA
is looking to combat, one would think that there should be no room
for unscrupulous agents to operate. Why then do some see it as the
norm in college athletics for an agent to pay college athletes in order
to obtain a commitment from the students to allow the agent to represent them?111 It starts with various agencies’ ability or zealousness in
enforcing the standards. If the agencies lack the ability, or fail to

105 A violation of either the federal or state law would fall under the prohibited conduct of
the RGCA. See NFLPA RGCA, supra note 13, at 8-11. The NFLPA has the authority to suspend for a period of time or permanently revoke an agent’s license for performing any of the
prohibited conduct in the RGCA. Id. at 17.
106 See id. at 13.
107 Id. at 15.
108
109
110

Id.
Id. at 16-17.
See id. at 17-18. The disciplinary process seems to put a seemingly insurmountable

burden on the agent to prove his innocence once CARD chooses to file a complaint. For a
discussion on the relative fairness of agent regulation by professional sports unions, see Richard
T. Karcher, Fundamental Fairness in Union Regulation of Sports Agents, 40 CONN. L. REV. 355
(2007).
111 See Dohrmann supra note 9. In Luchs’ recollection of life as an agent, he describes
college player’s receiving payments from agents as the norm. Id. According to Luchs, only a
few players ever rejected his offers to give the player some form of compensation. Id.
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zealously enforce their own standards, then clearly there is little that
can be done to prevent unethical agent activity.
A. NCAA
The NCAA has been extremely vocal and active in its attempt to
maintain its image as a true amateur athletic organization.112 However, the NCAA is powerless when it comes to sanctioning agents. Further, by the time any wrongdoing is discovered, often times a player
who has intentionally violated NCAA regulations has long since
113
graduated or is close to entering the NFL, leaving only the school,
which may have been entirely innocent in the matter, to suffer the
consequences for violating NCAA rules.114 The NCAA realizes that it
has limited power in this area and that in order for anything to change
115
there needs to be more involvement from the NFL and the NFLPA.
Given the NCAA’s lack of power to directly regulate agents, a
positive public perception of the NCAA as a legitimate organization
is essential in order to obtain the help of legislators and the help of
the NFLPA to protect the NCAA’s standards. This was highlighted
when investigators from North Carolina’s Secretary of State began an
investigation of NFLPA certified agent Gary Wichard.116 North Carolina’s investigation began as a result of a NCAA investigation involv117
ing Wichard and the University of North Carolina (UNC). Wichard
made multiple transactions with former UNC assistant football coach
112

chel

See Q & A with NCAA Director of Agent, Gambling and Amateurism Activities RaNewman
Baker,
NCAA.ORG
(July
29,
2010),

http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2010+news+storie
s/July+latest+news/Interview+with+NCAA+Director+of+Agent,+Gambling+and+Amateurism
+Activities.
113 The highly publicized scandal involving University of Southern California football star
Reggie Bush required a four-year investigation. Madison Gray, USC Trojans Get Black Eye
Over Reggie Bush Scandal, NEWSFEED.TIME.COM (June 10, 2010), http://newsfeed.
time.com/2010/06/10/usc-trojans-get-black-eye-over-reggie-bush-scandal. University of North
Carolina football player Robert Quinn was ruled ineligible for the 2010-2011 football season for
dealing with an agent. UNC Kicks Austin Off Team; 2 Others Declared Ineligible, SI.COM (Oct.
11, 2010), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/football/ncaa/10/11/unc.kicks.austin.off.team.ap/
index.html?xid=si _topstories. However, it did not have a major impact on his ability to be
drafted by an NFL team since some projected him as the seventh best player in the 2011 NFL
Draft. See Mel Kiper, Big Board Has a New No. 1, ESPN.COM, http://insider.espn.
go.com/nfl/draft2011/insider/news/story?id=6174328 (last updated Mar. 2, 2011).
114 Even if a school had no knowledge they were allowing an ineligible player to participate, they are still in violation of NCAA rules. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, at 43.
115 See Q & A with NCAA Director of Agent, Gambling and Amateurism Activities Rachel Newman Baker, supra note 112.
116 See Attorney: NC Investigators Interview Gary Wichard, USATODAY.COM,
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/acc/2010-10-05-wichard-blake-nflrelationship_N.htm?csp=34sports (last updated Oct. 5, 2010).
117

Id.
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118
John Blake. North Carolina’s investigation of the two deals primarily with several benefits received by Marvin Austin, a UNC football
119
player, while he was a student-athlete at UNC. Austin made several
trips to Miami and California, including two trips to a football training
facility two miles from Wichard’s agency.120 Austin’s name was listed
121
on hotel receipts directly above Wichard’s agency name. The investigation believes that Wichard either funded the trips directly, or used
Blake as a “runner” (person who acts on behalf of an agent) to pay
for Austin’s trips.122 There are also reports that Blake recommended
Wichard to former University of Alabama football player Marcell
Dareus and former University of South Carolina football player Wesley Saunders.123 Austin, Dareus, and Saunders were all sanctioned by
either the NCAA or their respective universities for improper agent
benefits.124 As of March 2, 2011, the investigation of Wichard was still
125
However, in December of 2010, the NFLPA suspended
ongoing.
Wichard for nine months “for having impermissible communication”
with a player in violation of the NFL CBA.126
While the NCAA has shown that it is committed to maintaining
its status as an organization that governs amateur collegiate athletics,
the public’s perception of the NCAA does not always match the
127
NCAA’s stated goals and objectives. The recent Cam Newton and

118 Charles Robinson, Money Trail Ties Agent, Ex-UNC Coach, RIVALS.COM (Sept. 29,
2010), http://rivals.yahoo.com/ ncaa/football/news?slug=cr-uncagents092910.
119
120
121
122

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.

123 Charles Robinson & Dan Wetzel, Sources: Blake Recommended Agent to Dareus,
RIVALS.COM (Oct. 3, 2010), http://rivals. yahoo.com/ncaa/football/news?slug=ys-dareus100310.
124 See id.; NCAA Requires Repayment, Loss of Contests for Marcell Dareus, NCAA.ORG
(Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/
2010+news+stories/September+latest+news/NCAA+REQUIRES+REPAYMENT,+LOSS+OF
+CONTESTS+FOR+MARCELL+DAREUS; Agent Scandal Costs UNC Three Players,
ESPN.COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5673405 (last updated Oct. 11, 2010).
125 Investigators were given a search warrant for Wichard’s financial records in an attempt
to prove Wichard had provided improper benefits to student-athletes in violation of North Carolina law. Agent’s Financial Records Sought, ESPN.COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/
story?id=6174078 (last updated Mar. 3, 2011).
126 Gary Wichard Suspended 9 Months, ESPN.COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/
story?id=5880708 (last updated Dec. 3, 2010).
127 See Gene Wojciechowski, The Cam Newton Affair Still Stinks, ESPN.COM (Jan. 21,

2011),
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/columns/story?columnist=wojciechowski_gene&page=wojcie
chowski/110121&sportCat=ncf.
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Ohio State University (“OSU”) scandals are two incidents in which
the NCAA drew heavy criticism for its disciplinary action.128
During the 2010-2011 football season, Cam Newton was accused
of soliciting universities for cash payments in exchange for his agreement to play at the university.129 The reports indicated that Newton
had sought $180,000 from Mississippi State University (“MSU”) in
130
In Deexchange for an agreement to play football at the school.
cember of 2009, Newton committed to play football at Auburn University (AU), a decision some believed was made by Newton’s father
Cecil.131 There were never any allegations that AU paid Newton or
his father for the commitment.132 The NCAA’s investigation revealed
that Cecil Newton did in fact solicit MSU, but Cam never knew, or
133
Since Cam did not have
had anything to do, with the solicitation.
any knowledge of his father’s actions, the NCAA ruled he was still
134
eligible to compete.
The OSU scandal involved several football players who accepted
improper benefits from a tattoo parlor and also sold some awards and
championship rings they received from various team achievements.135
The players all claimed that they did not know they were violating
NCAA rules.136 In December of 2010, the NCAA ruled that five of
the athletes would be suspended for the first five games of the 2011
football season, and a sixth player would miss the first game of the
137
2011 season. However, the players were not suspended for the Sugar Bowl game, which was played after the NCAA ruling but before

128 See Adam Ritenberg, NCAA, Sugar Bowl Defend OSU Decision, ESPN.COM (Dec. 29,
2010),
http://espn.go.com/blog/bigten/post/_/id/21560/ncaa-sugar-bowl-defend-osu-decision;
Bruce Feldman, With Buckeyes, NCAA Just Keeps Spinning, ESPN.COM (Dec. 29, 2010),
http://insider.espn.go.com/ncf/blog?name=feldman_bruce&id=5966094; Wojciechowski, supra

note 127.
129 Pat Forde, Chris Low & Mark Schlabach, Cash Sought for Cam Newton, ESPN.COM,
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5765214 (last updated Nov. 5, 2010).
130
131
132

Id.
Id.
Id.
NCAA

133
Addresses Cam Newton’s Eligibility, NCAA.ORG (Dec. 1, 2010),
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2010+news+storie
s/December/NCAA+addresses+eligibility+of+Cam+Newton.
134
135

Id.
Ohio State Football Players Sanctioned, ESPN.COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/

story?id=5950873 (last updated Dec. 26, 2010).
136 Pat Forde, NCAA Ruling Defies Common Sense, ESPN.COM (Dec. 23, 2010),
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/columns/story?columnist=forde_pat&id=5951832.
137 NCAA Requires Loss of Contests for Six Ohio State Football Student Athletes,
NCAA.ORG
(Dec.
23,
2010),
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/resources/latest+news/2010+news+stories/dec
ember/ncaa+requires+loss+of+contests+for+six+ohio+state+football+student-athletes.
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138
the 2011 football season. The NCAA stated that since the players
did not know they were violating NCAA rules, the punishments
139
would be delayed until the 2011 season.
Many people viewed the incident involving Cam Newton as indicating a major loophole in NCAA rules.140 The thought was that a
player could bypass NCAA rules by having a third-party negotiate
141
and accept payment from a school. This is not the case. The reason
Cam Newton was not suspended for violating NCAA rules was because there were no findings that he had any knowledge that his father was negotiating payments with schools in order to have his son
play for them.142 Additionally, there were no findings that Cecil Newton had received any payments from any schools. Had Cecil accepted
payments from a school, or anyone else, in order to ensure that Cam
would commit to a particular school, Cam would have been ruled ineligible, regardless of whether he knew about the negotiations and
payments.143 Even so, there was still a great deal of outrage by many
over the fact that there were no sanctions laid down upon either Cam
Newton or the University of Auburn as a result of what had transpired.
The public perception of the NCAA took another hit with the
rulings for the OSU athletes who were suspended.144 The five OSU
players were suspended for selling items they received from bowl
games they had played in while members of the OSU football team.145
While it may seem unusual to punish a student for selling their own
property, the rule serves a legitimate purpose. The rule is in place to
prevent athletes from selling memorabilia to agents or school boosters
for high prices as a way to circumvent the rules for paying athletes.
While the fact that the athletes were disciplined for selling their own
property was criticized, the main problem people had with the NCAA
was the timing of the punishment.146 All the players were allowed to

138
139
140

Id.
Id.
See NCAA Statement on Fairness of Rules Decisions, NCAA.ORG (Dec. 29, 2010),

http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2010+news+storie
s/December/NCAA+statement+on+fairness+of+rules+decisions.
141
142
143

Id.
Id.
Id.
See

144
Frank Deford, NCAA Football: All Dollars, No Sense, SI.COM,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/frank_deford/01/06/ncaa.money/index.html
(last
updated Jan. 7, 2011); NCAA Statement on Fairness of Rules Decisions, supra note 140.
145 Ohio State Football Players Sanctioned, supra note 135.
146 See Bruce Feldman, With Buckeyes, NCAA Just Keeps Spinning, BRUCE FELDMAN
BLOG (Dec. 29, 2010, 11:02 AM), http://insider.espn.go.com/ncf/blog?name=feldman_bruce
&id=5966094.
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play in the 2011 Sugar Bowl, and the suspensions were delayed until
the start of the 2011-2012 season.147 Five of the players facing suspension were eligible for the NFL draft so they could have easily escaped
any discipline at all by playing in the Sugar Bowl and then declaring
for the NFL draft.148
While the NCAA may have the public on its side when it comes
to agents who pay athletes, it seems to have lost some public sentiment, rightfully or not, when it comes to how it has handled other issues involving its regulation of amateur athletics. The fact that the
NCAA must rely on legislation as well as the NFLPA in order to help
enforce its standards for amateur athletics makes it important for the
NCAA to maintain a positive public image in order to gain support.
The media’s ability to affect policymaking plays an important
role in the NCAA’s goal of deterring unethical agents from tampering
with student-athlete eligibility. As far as policymaking in the United
States, “[t]he importance of the mass media in today’s society cannot
be overestimated.”149 “[M]edia coverage can and does influence the
decision to charge, the decision to reach a plea bargain, and the ultimate disposition. Responsible members of the media balance journal150
istic interests with the public’s interest in a fair justice system . . . .”
Legislation like SPARTA and the UAAA are based on the idea that
it is good public policy for the government to sanction agents who
151
violate NCAA rules. The reports indicating the NCAA’s inability
to sanction agents played a role in the state of North Carolina pursuing an investigation of Gary Wichard.152 While it may be unclear
whether the media influences the public or if the public influences the
media, the media can affect public opinion which can, in turn, affect
how public officials handle high profile issues.153 Given the substantial
impact the media can have on the NCAA’s image, and the effect that

147
148

Id.

Ohio State Coach Jim Tressel did make all the players commit to return to school before allowing the players to play in the game, and while all the players did commit, they could
easily break the promise and enter the draft. See Jim Tressel: Terrelle Pryor will Return,
ESPN.COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/bowls10/sugar/news/story?id=5970169 (last updated
Dec. 30, 2010).
149 Kristine A. Oswald, Mass Media and the Transformation of American Politics, 77
MARQ. L. REV. 385, 385 (1994).
150 Janine Robben, Oregon Media and Courts: A Guideline, 69 OR. ST. B. BULL. 33, 34
(2009).
151 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801-07 (2006); UAAA, supra note 15, at 1-2.
152 See Attorney: NC Investigators Interview Gary Wichard, USATODAY.COM,
http://www.
usatoday.com/sports/college/football/acc/2010-10-05-wichard-blake-nfl-relationship_N.htm?csp=
34sports (last updated Oct. 5, 2010).
153 Oswald, supra note 149, at 402.
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media coverage can have on lawmakers, it is essential for the NCAA
to maintain a positive public image when it comes to agents paying
student-athletes if the NCAA wants to see a substantial change.
B.

SPARTA and the UAAA

SPARTA and the UAAA are both relatively good pieces of legislation when it comes to covering the issues of unscrupulous agents
that the NCAA is trying to avoid. However, they are far from perfect.
SPARTA does not even consider the fact that the student-athlete
154
might be equally to blame for the fact that he is receiving benefits.
Oftentimes, it is the players who seek out agents in search of early
compensation.155 By assuming the athlete is completely innocent in
the matter, SPARTA leaves out what may be an equally liable party
in any potential damages suffered by a university.
The UAAA is a much more complete piece of legislation as it in156
cludes both a registration requirement and allows schools a right of
action against a student-athlete who accepted the funds.157 This is a
key difference between the UAAA and SPARTA because it gives the
schools a chance to fully recover any damages suffered. While allowing schools the ability to bring a suit against a former student-athlete
may seem like an appropriate and necessary standard, it is not likely
that schools will start suing their former students. The UAAA
acknowledges this as shown by the comment to section 16:
It is assumed that educational institutions will be very reluctant
to bring an action against a former student-athlete. Public opinion and the desire to be successful in future recruiting of athletes
should cause educational institutions to carefully consider whether to exercise the right . . . in most situations. There are, however, known instances of extremely egregious conduct which caused
serious damage to educational institutions. Subsection (a) keeps
open the possibility of a civil action against those individuals.158
The liability of the player is also separate from the liability of the
agent under the UAAA, which is also important because it allows the
school to recover damages from the agent without worrying that the
154

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801-07 (2006).
See Dohrmann, supra note 9. According to Luchs, players would ask for money not
only for themselves but for their teammates as well. Id. Additionally, players often brought up
the idea of payments as opposed to the agents pressuring the student to take the payments. Id.
156 UAAA, supra note 15, at 7 (“[A]n individual may not act as an athlete agent in this
155

State without holding a certificate of registration . . . .”).
157 Id. at 22 (“An educational institution has a right of action against . . . a former studentathlete for damages caused by a violation of this [Act].”).
158 Id. at 23.
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agent may indemnify the student, giving the appearance that a school
is suing its former player.159
The main problem with SPARTA and the UAAA is that they
are useless, unless zealously enforced. According to an Associated
Press report, less than half of the forty-two states who have either enacted the UAAA or some other form of agent regulating legislation,
have yet to revoke a single license, and SPARTA has not been en160
Both SPARTA and the UAAA were designed for
forced at all.
promoting true amateur competition in college sports, but without
enforcement, they are just empty words.
The lack of enforcement could be tied to the changing public sentiment towards the legitimacy of the NCAA. Aside from issues like
the NCAA’s handling of the Cam Newton and Ohio State situations,
there are those who believe that the NCAA, itself, is hypocritical because of the large television and coaching contracts allowed while not
allowing players to be paid. ESPN, alone, has paid over two billion
dollars for the rights to cover the Southeastern Conference’s games161
and another $300 million to the University of Texas as a part of the
162
University of Texas television network.
Headlines such as these can lead many people to think that the
NCAA institutions are seeing huge profits at the expense of the players who remain amateurs. While the large numbers grab the headlines, the fact that only fourteen out of 120 Football Bowl Subdivision
athletic programs showed a positive net revenue between 2004 and
2009 is indicative of the unrealistic perception of the NCAA schools.163
While public sentiment appears to be in favor of legal sanctions for
agents who tamper with the amateur status of collegiate athletes, the
competing notion (however incorrect it may be) that the NCAA is
creating a huge profit for the schools likely plays a part in the lack of
enforcement of the laws by the state and federal governments.
These negative perceptions of the NCAA, even if not the reality,
especially harm the NCAA when it comes to the enforcement of the

159
160

See id.
See Alan Scher Zagier, Agent Oversight Continues to Vex College Sports,

ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/02/agent-oversightcontinues_
n_703143.html.
161 ESPN Signs 15-Year Deal with SEC, ESPN.COM (Aug. 25, 2008), http://
sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=3553033.
162 Texas, ESPN Announce New Network, ESPN.COM (Jan. 19, 2011), http://
sports.espn.go.com/espn/news/story?id=6037857.
163 Behind the Blue Disk – FBS Athletic Revenues and Expenses, NCAA.ORG (Oct. 15,
2010), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Behind+the+Blue+Disk/
Behind+the+Blue+Disk+-+FBS+Athletic+Revenues+and+Expenses.
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UAAA. The UAAA makes it very clear in its prefatory note that one
of the primary reasons for the drafting of the law was because the
NCAA requested a uniform law that would help enforce the NCAA’s
164
rules. “[T]he NCAA and several universities asked the Conference
to undertake the drafting of a Uniform Act. After initial reluctance . .
165
. the Conference agreed to do so.” The fact that the drafters of the
UAAA specifically state that the reason for drafting it was to satisfy
the NCAA’s request makes the NCAA’s maintenance of not only the
actual legitimacy, but the perceived legitimacy of their amateur league
of the utmost importance if the states are expected to zealously enforce the UAAA.
While bad publicity towards the NCAA may have an effect on
whether the UAAA is enforced, the old saying, “no publicity is bad
publicity,” may ring true for the NCAA’s hope in sanctioning unscrupulous agents. The NCAA’s handling of the Cam Newton scandal
was not viewed very favorably by the media.166 However, following
the media reports of the scandal, the state of Mississippi and the FBI
167
The inbegan investigations on whether agent laws were broken.
vestigations focus on Kenny Rogers, a former Mississippi State University (“MSU”) football player.168 The allegations were that Rogers
assisted Cecil Newton in soliciting Cam’s services to MSU in exchange
169
for $180,000. Although Rogers is not a certified agent, or acting as
an agent in the sense that he would be negotiating a contract with a
professional team, he still may be considered an agent under either
SPARTA or the UAAA.170 If the investigations find he did in fact
negotiate to have Cam Newton paid, he would likely qualify as an
agent under either act because he negotiated for an athlete to be paid
for playing.171 Even though the NCAA did not receive a favorable
media depiction following the scandal, the fact that it was widely re164

UAAA, supra note 15, at 1

165

Id.
See Wojciechowski, supra note 127.
See David Brandt, Law Enforcement Probes NCAA Issues Under Agent Act,

166
167

BOSTON.COM (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.boston.com/sports/colleges/football/articles/2010/
12/08/law_enforcement_probes_ncaa_issues_under_agent_act/; Attorney: John Bond Talks to
FBI, ESPN.COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5813734 (last updated Nov. 17,
2010). The FBI did not comment on the investigation and the article did not mention a specific
crime they were investigating. However, the only logical reason for an FBI investigation in the
matter would be to enforce SPARTA.
168 Brandt, supra note 167.
169
170
171

Id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 7801(2); UAAA, supra note 15, at 3.
See UAAA, supra note 15, at 3. The lack of cases on either SPARTA or the UAAA

leaves the question of whether or not Rogers would be considered an agent uncertain. There is
a valid argument that if Cam Newton did not authorize Rogers to negotiate on his behalf, then
Rogers would not qualify as an agent under the laws.
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ported caused the state and federal governments to investigate the
matter. If this is the start of a trend, it bodes well for the NCAA since
their standards could be enforced regardless of whether they are perceived as having handled the situation appropriately or not.
Additionally, even if enforced, the financial penalty assessed under the UAAA is a maximum of $25,000,172 which may not be enough
to deter an agent from the potential rewards of signing a top college
athlete. The players selected in the first round of the 2010 NFL Draft
signed contracts ranging in value from $9 million to $78 million over
the life of the contract.173 At the standard three percent commission,
the agents representing those players took commissions ranging from
$27,000 to $234,000 for negotiating those contracts.174 Even at the
lowest end of the first round, an agent would still make $2,000 over
the total fine if caught.175 While the financial deterrent of the legislation may not be sufficient, the fact that a criminal record would make
an agent ineligible for certification under the NFLPA RGCA may still
allow the UAAA to be an effective piece of legislation if it were enforced regularly. However, this still depends on the UAAA being
regularly enforced. Regardless of how high the penalty may be, without enforcement, there will never be a deterrent. Absent zealous enforcement, both SPARTA and the UAAA are meaningless.
C.

NFLPA

The NFLPA has the greatest authority and ease of prosecuting
rogue agents, but it also has the least amount of incentive and prose176
Further,
cutors to investigate any potential claims against agents.
177
the NFLPA is the official representative of the players.
It would
therefore be counter-intuitive to its purpose if the NFLPA were to
bring to light how many of its players openly accepted unauthorized
benefits while playing in college. Publicizing this information would
look bad on the part of the players, and the NFLPA would not be
looking out for the best interest of its members if it reported their un172
173

AM),
picks.

Id. at 23.
Contract Status of ’10 First-Round Draft Picks, NFL NATION BLOG (July 29, 2010, 11:39
http://espn.go.com/blog/nflnation/post/_/id/25223/contract-status-of-10-first-round-draft-

174 NFL agents can take a maximum of three percent of the value of a player’s contract as
compensation for their work. NFLPA RGCA, supra note 13, at 12.
175 Given the fact that these laws are rarely enforced, the risk appears to be worth the
reward. See Zagier, supra note 160.
176 CARD, the appointed enforcement committee for the NFLPA RGCA, is limited to
three to five appointed members. NFLPA RGCA, supra note 13, at 15.
177 NFL CBA, supra note 1, at xiv (“[T]he [NFLPA] . . . is recognized as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of present and future employee players in the NFL . . . .”).
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ethical acts. Moreover, although NFLPA executive director DeMau178
rice Smith claims that curbing the issue is a priority for the NFLPA,
the players in the league likely do not see this as an issue worth taking
seriously as they benefit from the payment received in college and
suffer little to no consequences as a result of violating NCAA rules.179
According to an anonymous blog written by an NFL player, players in
the league openly joke about having to take a pay cut when they enter
the NFL from college and give other teammates a hard time for not
180
If the
getting more money from agents while playing in college.
players show little interest in the situation, then the NFLPA will not
show interest either. The rules in the NFLPA RGCA have no effect
unless the players want them to be enforced and as long as the players
feel that the agents paying college players is not a bad thing, the
NFLPA will not actively pursue the issue.
The best way for the NFLPA to effectively combat the issue of
agents they certify paying college players would be for the NFLPA to
take an active role in investigating the issues and enforcing their rules.
This is extremely unlikely to occur anytime in the near future. The
current NFL CBA went into effect on August 4, 2011.181 This agreement was signed after a 130-day lockout by the owners of the NFL
182
franchises. Among the key issues negotiated in the new collective
bargaining agreement were player safety, an eighteen-game NFL season, revenue sharing, workers compensation, and players’ salaries.183
Noticeably missing from the NFLPA’s list of issues of concern was
how to handle agents who violate the rules and pay collegiate athletes.
It is questionable how much the NFLPA actually cares about the
issue, regardless of what they may state publicly. According to former
agent Jeff Luchs, up until 1999, the NFLPA allowed agents to recover
178 Mike & Mike in the Morning: Show in Review, ESPN.COM (July 21, 2010),
http://espn.go.com/espnradio/show/_/showId/mikeandmike/postId/5398131/show-review (select
the link titled, NFLPA executive director DeMaurice Smith).
179 Reggie Bush’s only penalty was the loss of his Heisman trophy and some personal
shame from his former university. See Pedro Maura, USC Takes Down Reggie Bush Jersey,
ESPNLOSANGELES.COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/los-angeles/ncf/news/story?id=5562582 (last
updated Sept. 12, 2010). The three players from North Carolina lost only a portion of their
NCAA eligibility, but they are still eligible and ranked high for the 2011 NFL Draft. See 2011
NFL Draft – Prospects by College: North Carolina, ESPN.COM, http://insider.espn.go.com/nfl/
draft/schools/_/id/2327/north-carolina (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
180 NFL Player X, Agent Payouts? No Big Deal, PLAYER X BLOG (Oct. 15, 2010, 11:46
AM), http://insider.espn.go.com/insider/blog?name=player_x&id=5687781.
181 NFL CBA, supra note 1.
182 Adam Schefter, Sources: Deal to End Lockout Reached, ESPN.COM, http://espn.
go.com/nfl/story/_/id/6797238/2011-nfl-lockout-owners-players-come-deal-all-points-sources-say
(last updated July 25, 2011).
183 See Lockout Central Fact Sheets, NFLPLAYERS.COM, http://www.nflplayers.com/aboutus/2011-Lockout-Central/Fact-Sheets/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).

2011]

Regulation of Sports Agents and College Football

211

funds from a student-athlete who accepted payments but did not end
up signing with the agent.184 Luchs claims, that after paying the players, the agents could sue a player to recover the payments if that play185
While this may have been the
er ended up using another agent.
case, it is extremely unlikely that a court would enforce an agent’s
right to recover funds he paid a student-athlete, in violation of NCAA
rules. Courts would likely find that upholding NCAA standards is in
the public interest and would therefore not permit an agent to recover
his funds under either an unclean hands, illegality, or public policy
exception to enforcing the agreement.186 While the agents may not
have been able to recover their payments in court, the fact that the
NFLPA permitted them to try, shows that the NFLPA does not have
a track record of taking unethical agent issues seriously.
The NFLPA’s handling of two publicized agent scandals also
calls into question the organization’s commitment to harsh punishments for agents who violate the NFLPA RGCA. Following the
scandal involving NFLPA sanctioned agent Gary Wichard, the
NFLPA suspended Wichard for nine months.187 While this discipline
may seem like the NFLPA is taking the issue seriously, when compared to how the NFLPA sanctioned agent Teague Egan, it shows
that the NFLPA is really not taking the issue seriously. Egan created
a scandal when he gave a University of Southern California (“USC”)
football player a ride across campus in a golf cart, in violation of
NCAA rules.188 The NFLPA revoked Egan’s agent certification as a
result of the scandal stating Egan “is not fit to be a certified contract
advisor.”189 Even though the NCAA determined that players linked
190
to Wichard received roughly $23,500 in benefits, the NFLPA only
suspended Wichard for nine months. The only logical conclusion is
that the NFLPA considers a ride on a golf cart to be a more serious
violation than providing $23,500 in benefits.
It is possible that the unequal sanctioning of the two agents is due
to the fact that the NFPLA only found Wichard had “impermissible
communication,” while Egan was found to have provided a benefit.191
However, it is more likely that the sanctions had to do with the stature
of the agent within the NFL community. Eagan was an undergradu184

Dohrmann, supra note 9.

185

Id.
See Walters v. Fullwood, 675 F. Supp. 155, 160-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Gary Wichard Suspended 9 Months, supra note 126.
See Moura, supra note 38.
Gary Wichard Suspended 9 Months, supra note 126.
See Agent Scandal Costs UNC Three Players, ESPN.COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/

186
187
188
189
190

ncf/news/story?id=5673405 (last updated Oct. 11, 2010).
191 See Gary Wichard Suspended 9 Months, supra note 126.
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ate student at USC, and although certified by the NFLPA, he had no
192
193
clients. Wichard, on the other hand, has been an agent since 1980.
He has an extensive client list, which includes star players such as
Dwight Freeney, Jason Taylor, Terrell Suggs, and Antonio Cromartie.194 He has negotiated three record-breaking NFL contracts for his
195
clients. In the 2010 NFL Draft alone, Wichard had five players that
he represented who were drafted,196 including a first-round pick (Spiller)197 and three second-round picks (Clause, Mays, and Benn).198 Given Wichard’s prominent client list, it is far more likely that the
NFLPA preferred a slap on the wrist for Wichard since revoking his
license would leave a number of players without an agent. The
NFLPA may be able to justify the seemingly light discipline if it
chooses to only accept that Wichard had improper contact with a student-athlete. However, should the pending state investigation convict
Wichard of a violation of the UAAA, the NFLPA would likely have
no choice but to revoke Wichard’s license.199
While the NFLPA has claimed to have an interest in sanctioning
agents who violate the NFLPA RGCA, their unwillingness to also
assess penalties to players leaves their commitment to the issue still
unknown.
The NFLPA is opposed to any penalty being imposed upon a
player in the NFL for conduct relating to the receipt of benefits
in violation of NCAA rules while the player was in college.
However, [the NFLPA] will continue to discuss with the NCAA .

192

Moura, supra note 38.

193

Gary Wichard Suspended 9 Months, supra note 126.
See Client List, PRO TECT MANAGEMENT, http://www.nothinbutfreaks.com/clientlist

194

(last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
195 See News, PRO TECT MANAGEMENT, http://www.nothinbutfreaks.com/news-archives
(last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
196 NFL Live: Nothin’ But Freaks (ESPN television broadcast Feb. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.nothinbutfreaks.com/videos/214101. These players were Jimmy Clausen, C.J. Spiller,
Taylor Mays, Everson Griffen, and Arrelious Benn.
197 2010 NFL Draft Pick List and Results – Round 1, ESPN.COM, http://insider.
espn.go.com/nfl/draft/rounds/_/year/2010 (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
198 2010 NFL Draft Pick List and Results – Round 2, ESPN.com, http://insider.
espn.go.com/nfl/draft/rounds/_/round/2/year/2010 (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
199 See NFLPA RGCA, supra note 13, at 9, 17. The NFLPA RGCA do not have any mandatory discipline requirements. See id. at 17. However, if a ride on a golf cart warranted revoking Egan’s license, then a criminal conviction should merit having Wichard’s license revoked as
well.
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. . issues relating to the conduct of agents certified by the NFLPA
as they interact with NCAA players.200
This is a logical position for the NFLPA to take as it would not
be popular or very fair to sanction individuals for actions before they
became members of the union. However, the NFLPA does have a
duty to make sure that agents representing their players are ethical.201
This puts the NFLPA in a difficult situation. They would likely anger
their members if they allowed players to be sanctioned for actions
prior to membership with the NFLPA. However, enforcing rules
against agents may harm their members as it would make the members’ unethical activity public. While the NFLPA may never take the
drastic step of allowing their members to face repercussions for unethical acts prior to membership, they do have the duty to sanction the
unethical agents. However, it seems that, in reality, they are unwilling
to sanction anyone.
IV.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

While there is a great deal of focus on how bad the situation has
become, there are also several ways in which unethical agent activity
can be eliminated.
A. The Media’s Role
The media may play the largest role in forcing the various agencies to work together to make some kind of change to the landscape
where unethical agents are the norm instead of the exception. As
more and more news outlets continue to report on the high level of
unscrupulous activity in the NCAA, it may cause the states with agent
regulation and the FTC to begin enforcing the laws by following up
202
with investigations based on media reports. It may also cause states
without legislation to consider adopting the UAAA based on the fact

200 Joe Schad, NCAA: No Suspensions for NFL Rookies, ESPN.COM,
http://sports.
espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5733652 (last updated Oct. 27, 2010) (quoting an NFLPA statement).
201 See NFLPA RGCA, supra note 13, at 17.
202 The investigation of Wichard in North Carolina is a clear example of this. See Attorney:
NC Investigators Interview Gary Wichard, USATODAY.COM, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/
college/football/acc/2010-10-05-wichard-blake-nfl-relationship_N.htm?csp=34sports (last updated Oct. 5, 2010). As a result of the increased media attention, Oregon has plans to change its
legislation in order to more effectively prosecute unscrupulous agents. See Oregon Legislation
Would Crack Down on Sports Agents’ Influence on College Athletes, ORGEGONLIVE.COM
(Oct.
13,
2010),
http://www.oregonlive.com/collegefootball/index.ssf/2010/10/oregon_legislation_would
_crack.html.
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that not having the legislation may look bad considering the amount
of news coverage this topic has received. Lastly, it may cause schools
to feel more comfortable bringing civil suits against agents or former
players.
If more agents were found guilty in court, it would likely force
the NFLPA to act even if the players do not really care whether or
not the agents are giving players benefits in college. Even if the
NFLPA were to eliminate the prohibitions of agents soliciting clients
203
through gifts or pursuing clients who are not yet eligible for the
draft,204 it would likely never eliminate the requirement that all NFL
contract advisors must “fully comply with all state and federal laws.”205
Even if the RGCA allowed any and all contact by agents with college
athletes, the fact that these actions would violate state or federal law
would force the NFLPA to suspend or revoke the agent’s license, unless the NFLPA wanted to eliminate the requirement that their contract advisors not have a criminal record. Under this potential solution, the media’s continued reporting of the issue may trigger the
more zealous enforcement of the laws, which in turn, would force the
NFLPA to suspend agents, regardless if the players are not concerned
with the issue.
While the media has helped bring to light the major issues involving agents paying college athletes, it has also painted a picture of the
NCAA in a negative light. The public appeared to be on the side of
the NCAA in the early part of the 2010-2011 football season when
reports of unscrupulous agents were prevalent.206 However, by the
end of the season, hot button news stories shifted from unscrupulous
agents to unscrupulous players. The Cam Newton and Ohio State
stories overshadowed the agent issues by the season’s end. Much of
the media attention following these stories focused on how the
NCAA handled the discipline in these scandals, as opposed to focusing on the players, their family members, and the rules they broke.207
Since the purpose of SPARTA and the UAAA is the protection
of the NCAA’s rules as well as the schools and athletes, it is essential
that the NCAA remains an institution that is viewed as worthy of protection. When the Oregon State Legislature indicated its willingness
203

NFLPA RGCA, supra note 13, at 8.
Id. at 11.
205 Id. at 7.
206 See Joe Schad, Financial Penalties for Players Possible , ESPN.COM, http://
sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5725836 (last updated Oct. 26, 2010).
207 See College Football Live: Mark May Blasts the NCAA (ESPN television broadcast
Dec. 23, 2010), available at http://search.espn.go.com/mark-may-blasts/; The Sports Reporters:
Parting Shot: NCAA Hypocrisy (ESPN television broadcast Dec. 26, 2010), available at http://
search.espn.go.com/ncaa-hypocrisy/; Wojciechowski, supra note 127.
204
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to curb unethical agent activity, it was at the height of the media coverage of the issue.208 While a commitment from states to enforce these
laws is a major step towards seeing an actual change in unethical
agent activity, what appears to be a constant change in the media’s
portrayal of the NCAA may prevent the required follow-through due
to a lack of public support.
B.

Minor League Football

The NFL is the only professional sports league in the U.S. in
which players have no option other than college where they can showcase their skills for a potential spot on a professional roster. Major
League Baseball (“MLB”), the National Basketball Association
(“NBA”) and the National Hockey League each have expansive minor leagues where players can be compensated for playing and have
209
the opportunity to audition for the top-level teams. Aside from the
NBA’s minor league, players hoping for a career in the NBA, as witnessed by the success of players like Brandon Jennings, have the option of playing in the professional leagues in Europe before entering
210
The NBA also only requires players to wait one
the NBA draft.
year after graduating high school before entering the NBA, and there
is a distinct possibility that this rule will be short lived as the players
are fighting to eliminate the rule completely.211
While these sports are by no means clean of unscrupulous agents
paying players, there is not a consistent barrage of news relating to
agents paying college hockey, baseball, and basketball players (basketball receives the most attention, but it does not compare to the
level of football). A potential reason for this is the fact that players
who wish to get paid immediately have some legitimate option in
which they can showcase their talents to professional teams while re-

208 See Oregon Legislation Would Crack Down on Sports Agents’ Influence on College
Athletes, supra note 202.
209 See
Official Info, MILB.COM, http://web.minorleaguebaseball.com/milb/info/
affiliations.jsp (last visited Mar. 7, 2011); NBA D-League Announces NBA Affiliates for 201011 Season, NBA.COM (July 6, 2010), http://www.nba.com/dleague/news/affiliates_2010.html;
National Hockey League Minor League Affiliations, http://www.dickestel.com/hockeyaffil.htm

(last updated Feb. 15, 2011).
210 See Pete Thamel, At 19, Plotting New Path to N.B.A, via Europe, NYTIMES.COM (Oct.
4, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/05/sports/basketball/05jennings.html?_r=1.
211 See NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT ARTICLE X, available at
http://www.nbpa.org/sites/default/files/ARTICLE%20X.pdf; Chris Broussard, Players Seek End
of Age Restriction, ESPN.COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=5899152 (last
updated Dec. 9, 2010).
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212
A legitimate minor
ceiving some compensation for their work.
league football league under the NFL would give players who wish to
be paid an option other than college football in which to impress NFL
teams and allow the true student-athletes to compete as amateurs at
the college level. This plan would likely take time given the popularity and exposure that an athlete can receive while playing in college.
However, if players were successful in the NFL after spending time
playing minor league football, it would likely serve as a viable alternative to the athlete who wishes to be paid immediately after leaving
high school.
The NFL should follow the lead of the MLB. No matter how
high profile a player is, or whether the player is entering a professional career directly from high school or after a career in college athletics, there never seems to be any controversy of agents paying baseball
players in exchange for the player signing on to be represented by the
agent. While it is possible this is due to the fact that college football is
far more popular than college baseball,213 it is more likely the result of
the growth of Minor League Baseball.
214
It consists of
Minor League Baseball is an affiliate of MLB.
nineteen leagues ranging in classification from rookie (lowest level) to
215
Triple-A (highest level). Each team associated with the various Minor League Baseball leagues is affiliated with an MLB team.216 The
affiliation with a MLB team makes the choice to play in the Minor
Leagues a viable alternative to college baseball for players who would
like to receive compensation for playing as well as showcase their talents to MLB teams. The fact that Minor League teams are affiliated
with MLB teams also benefits MLB as they can directly monitor and
train the athletes who will one day play for them as opposed to relying
on the training from college coaches who may differ in philosophy
from them.
The success of Minor League Baseball217 indicates that a successful minor league football system is not unrealistic. The NFL could

212 While there are other professional football leagues such as the Canadian Football
League and the United Football League, these leagues have never been viewed as legitimate
alternatives to college football as a means of auditioning for an NFL roster.
213 See Football Expands Lead Over Baseball as America’s Favorite Sport , supra note 24.
College football was ranked as the third most popular sport in America while college baseball
did not make the list. Id.
214 Affiliates, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/index.jsp (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
215 Standings, MILB.COM, http://web.minorleaguebaseball.com/milb/standings/ (last visited
Mar. 7, 2011).
216 Official Info, MILB.COM, http://web.minorleaguebaseball.com/milb/info/affiliations.jsp
(last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
217 Attendance for Minor League games has gone up in twenty-four of the last twenty-nine
seasons and reached a record high in total attendance in 2008 with forty-three million tickets
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even implement a minor league system without eliminating its requirement that all NFL players be three years removed from high
school. The league could allow players to go directly from high school
to the minor leagues but still force them to wait three years before
becoming eligible for an NFL roster.
The primary selling point to those players who have no interest in
competing at the amateur level would be that the minor league teams
would be affiliated with NFL clubs.218 This would allow those players
who only wish to play professional football to have the chance to
prove themselves directly to an NFL franchise and potentially weed
out all the players from college football who would be susceptible to
unscrupulous agents. While there would be potential benefits to the
NFL and to players who wish be paid immediately, unfortunately,
there is no real incentive for the NFL to invest in a minor league system. They essentially have a risk-free minor league in the NCAA,
and it is unlikely the NFL would risk a failed minor league if they do
not need to.
While a large-scale minor league system is not likely to take
shape anytime in the near future, if the NCAA and the NFL have aspirations of maintaining true amateur football, then they should welcome the idea. NFL franchises would have the ability to train and
scout players before committing them to NFL rosters, and the NCAA
would likely rid itself of the players most likely to tarnish its image of
a true amateur athletics association.
C.

NFLPA General Counsel for Contract Negotiation

Although realistically, this is most unlikely to occur, the most effective way to cure the problem of agents paying college players
would be to eliminate the competition for players. Much like the
NFLPA hires a general counsel for all legal issues,219 the NFLPA
could hire a team of contract advisors to assist players in contract negotiations with teams. Agents would be paid a salary and would
therefore eliminate the competition to represent the most high-profile
athletes. This system could immediately eliminate the need for agents
to pay college athletes as the agents would be NFLPA employees and

sold that year.
The History & Function of Minor League Baseball , MLB.COM,
http://web.minorleaguebaseball.com/milb/history/general_history.jsp (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
218 This would be a major distinguishing factor from other football leagues such as the
Arena Football League. See NFL CBA, supra note 1, at 129.
219 See
Department
Contacts,
NFLPA.ORG,
http://www.nflplayers.com/aboutus/Department
--Contacts/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
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would not have to compete for the highest commission as they would
be paid salary.
The only incentive that an agent has in paying a collegiate athlete
is the potential that the payments will lead to the player allowing the
agent to represent the player in contract negotiations. With thirty-two
current NFL teams allowed to have up to a fifty-three man roster, the
220
maximum number of NFL players at any given time is only 1696.
With such a limited number of potential clients there is clearly a great
deal of competition for the valuable commodity of negotiating a player’s next contract. Additionally, each year there are roughly 224 collegiate athletes drafted by NFL teams.221 For a person trying to become an agent, this indicates the maximum number of potential clients who are guaranteed to not already have representation. With
such a small pool of potential clients and the lack of enforcement of
regulations, it is no wonder that agents bend the rules by paying players. The hope is that these illegal payments may give them the edge
when it comes time to sign the players as new clients. Eliminating this
extremely competitive aspect of the agent’s business would eliminate
agent’s incentive to pay players.
While this solution would produce the most immediate results, it
is by far the least likely to occur. The players would likely not be in
favor of this solution as they would probably much rather have an
agent motivated by higher commission representing them in negotiations with teams over their salaries. Even if the NFLPA-governed
agents were held to the strictest of fiduciary duties, it is still unlikely
that the players would prefer this method over the current system of
agents receiving a three-percent commission on contract negotiations.
While this solution would be the most effective, it is unlikely to ever
take shape as the players would likely not be in favor of this proposal
at all.
IV. CONCLUSION
While at the moment, agents appear free to violate NCAA rules,
the federal law in SPARTA, the state laws for the states that have
enacted the UAAA and the NFLPA RGCA without fear of repercussion, there may be hope for the future. The NCAA faces the obstacles of continuing to maintain itself as a true amateur league while
also battling the often-unfair negative perception that it is hypocritical
220 See Teams, NFL.COM, http://www.nfl.com/teams (last visited Mar. 7, 2011); NFL CBA,
supra note 1, at 145.
221 See NFL CBA, supra note 1, at 17. The NFL Draft consists of seven rounds with each
team receiving one pick in every round. Id.

2011]

Regulation of Sports Agents and College Football

219

in calling itself an amateur league. Even with the negative perception
that the NCAA sometimes receives, it still seems to maintain public
support when it comes to enforcing rules against agents paying college
athletes.
Public support is likely the key to ensuring the enforcement of
the NCAA rules on amateur athletics. Whether this comes in the
form of actual enforcement of laws, the NFLPA hoping to curb negative publicity by stripping unscrupulous agents of their licenses, or
some new policy such as an NFLPA take-over of contract negotiations or minor league football, it seems that public support of the
NCAA is the key to ensuring that the NCAA’s standards are enforced.
While an immediate change in the landscape of the NCAA is unlikely, the fact that there are now state and federal laws to make
agents who pay college athletes not only unethical but criminal, and
heavy media coverage of the issue shows that change is likely. Enforcement of the laws will force not only the NFLPA, but also other
leagues with unethical agents to suspend or revoke those agents’ licenses and hopefully allow for amateur athletics without the cloud of
under-the-table payments from agents.

